Janeway Institute and Faculty of Economics Postdoctoral Fellow
University of Cambridge
I am an economist working at the intersection of finance and industrial organization, with a particular focus on how AI, big data, and algorithms are shaping finance and the economy.
Prior to Cambridge, I was a Visiting Scholar at the MIT Department of Economics, a Senior Economist at Luohan Academy (initiated by Alibaba Group and Ant Group), and a Research Fellow at the Laboratory for Economic Analysis and Design, MIT. I received my Ph.D. in Economics at the University of California, Los Angeles (UCLA).
Research Themes: AI and Fintech Digital Markets and Information
Presented at MIT IO Lunch, Imperial Business School Fintech Conference, University of Cambridge, 2026 RAPS/RCFS Europe Conference, scheduled at 2026 Conference on Frontiers in Machine Learning and Economics. Draft pending data-disclosure review
I study a generative-AI tool providing licensed brokers with reply suggestions at Ant Insurance, China's largest insurance brokerage. A ten-week randomized broker-level pilot precedes a 20-day customer-level experiment involving 164,732 customers and 1,070 brokers. Linked rollout records cover about 1.3 million customers. AI-assisted insurance advisory deepens customer engagement and increases life-insurance purchases. Customers who had shown interest but not bought purchase more life insurance and show persistent premium gains. Revenue gains rise with broker ability, even though more capable brokers adopt AI suggestions less frequently. A model-based decomposition attributes most of the fitted ability gap to differences in implied returns per adoption. Earlier access leaves persistent advantages in broker performance and effort after full rollout. These findings show that generative AI can complement existing human capital and amplify performance differences, while adoption frequency can be a misleading proxy for economic value.
Presented at CMU, MIT, ESWC2025, 118th Annual Conference on Taxation, EAAMO'25, West Virginia University, Philadelphia Fed, Edinburgh Financial Technology Conference
Leveraging data from a major fintech lending provider for SMEs in China and a natural experiment from a temporary and geographically discontinuous interest rate discount policy, we analyze the presence of information asymmetries, selection, and market power. Our findings reveal a decrease in the average probability of loan repayment following interest rate reductions, indicating that selection is advantageous. We explain the effect in a generalized Stiglitz-Weiss model accounting for a broad distribution of borrower risk and returns, supported by empirical evidence. Building on our estimated demand elasticities and selection effects, we assess the welfare implications of information-sharing and pro-competition policies. Our counterfactual analysis reveals that ensuring competition and mandating information sharing across financial providers results in the largest surplus gains. Meanwhile, optimal information disclosure significantly mitigates monopoly distortions by increasing credit supply to riskier borrowers.
Presented at NASM 2024, MIT, 2026 MFA Annual Meeting
Fintech credit through digital payment platforms reaches 500 million Chinese consumers, many of whom hold no traditional bank credit line. We use de-identified administrative data from Alipay covering 60 months of full payment activity, both online and in-person, across payment instruments and consumption categories, for a sample drawn from a near-billion-consumer population. This provides the first integrated view of consumer payment and credit behavior in China. Using the January 2020 Covid-19 outbreak as a quasi-exogenous liquidity shock and a matched difference-in-differences design on 434,398 consumers, we find that fintech credit users sustain 10.2% higher consumption over the following two years. The response is concentrated among consumers facing binding liquidity constraints: low income, less developed regions, and limited external bank credit. The effect is further amplified among less financially sophisticated consumers, suggesting that fintech credit lowers the financial expertise required to access and use credit effectively.
Presented at Oligo Workshop 2025
I consider the generation and provision of information products, such as generative artificial intelligence models, in the information markets. Sellers of information must make an investment to deliver quality experiments. The level of investment determines the informativeness of the best experiment a seller can provide. Heterogeneous buyers face a decision problem with the uncertainty of the true state and can purchase experiments to augment their private information. Sellers design a menu of experiments and prices for the market. I characterize the optimal menu given any investment level and derive the optimal investment. When two sellers compete with investment, we study an equilibrium in which two sellers split the market. Each seller specializes in generating a more informative signal about one of the states. Under a general assumption of cost structures, the monopoly seller always provides more informative experiments and to more buyers than in the case of duopoly competition.
Presented at BIS
Breakthroughs in artificial intelligence are reshaping credit markets by enabling real-time risk management, not merely better screening at origination. Using proprietary, high-frequency data on a sample of 800,000 small-business borrowers drawn from a large platform lender, covering January 2018 to March 2021, we show that the AI-powered lending system actively adjusts credit access, credit lines, and interest rates as risk conditions change, leveraging real-time big data on borrowers to contain losses in the unsecured credit loans. Employing an instrumental-variables design, we identify a causal effect of platform dependence on default: greater dependence lowers default, consistent with stronger repayment incentives from continued platform participation. These findings reveal a distinctive feature of AI-powered platform lending: it is most effective when algorithmic risk management is integrated with platform access and activity.
Draft pending data-disclosure review
We exploit China's 2022 Algorithm Recommendation Regulation, which required digital platforms to provide consumers with an opt-out option for personalized recommendations, to identify the causal effects of opting out across the full consumer behavioral funnel. Using granular administrative data that track the actual browsing, clicking, and purchasing behavior of more than 153,542 consumers before and after opt-out, we find that e-commerce spending among regular purchasers falls by 7.5%, with the effect deepening to 9% over six months. The mechanism operates through product discovery: the number of browsed items declines by 34%, while conditional conversion rates remain unchanged, indicating that recommendations expand consumers' consideration sets rather than persuading them at the point of purchase. The entire decline in spending is concentrated among long-tail sellers, suggesting that recommendation systems function as discovery infrastructure for niche sellers in the marketplace. By contrast, the same consumers' other day-to-day expenditures, as observed through a digital payment service, remain unaffected, suggesting that recommendation algorithms create demand rather than merely reallocate it.
Presented at INFORMS 2025, University of Cambridge
A recommender faces consumers who can verify recommendations, but differ in their attention costs or in the salience of their choice of adoption. We characterize the conditions under which a technology that increases transparency by lowering the cost of verifying a product's quality will increase or decrease false recommendations. Without commitment, reducing verification costs never increases false recommendations, but when the recommender can commit to a policy, transparency can worsen both the quality of recommendations and consumer welfare. The necessary and sufficient condition is that the log-elasticity of the distribution of consumer cost types is decreasing. It can hold when the distribution is sufficiently fat-tailed, or when it mixes sophisticated and naive consumers. Our results can be applied to platform-recommended listings, security ratings, and audits.
My teaching interests span fintech, digital economy (data and platform economics), household finance, information economics, and game theory and strategies.
MIT 14.772 · Guest Lecturer
Alibaba Global Initiatives · Lecturer
UCLA · Lecturer
UCLA · Lecturer
UCLA · Lecturer